Posted in Security, Technology, tagged anti-virus, biodiversity, citrix, Data Breach, Data security, diversity, Gartner, HVD, IBM, Microsoft, standardization, VDI, Verizon, Virtualization, VMWare on June 15, 2009|
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Consolidation is the major benefit or “killer app” for server/data center virtualization. Standardization is the major benefit or “killer app” for client-side virtualization.
As I was pondering the challenges of current systems management processes, researching the latest and greatest from the client-side virtualization vendors, and talking to a lot of large organizations I was trying to find that one thing that explained the operational benefits of client-side virtualization. There are more than one, but it really does come down to standardization, allow me to explain… (more…)
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Posted in Security, tagged Amazon AWS, Amazon EC2, Amazone S3, cloud computing, Compliance, Data security, database security, firewall, Google App Engine, Microsoft Azure, Sarbanes-Oxley, SAS 70, Security, SOX, Xen hypervisor on December 10, 2008|
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Recently I posted some thoughts on cloud security (here), (here), and (here). The bottom line still holds true…
When we allow services to be delivered by a third party we lose all control over how they secure and maintain the health of their environment and in many cases we lose all visibility into the controls themselves, that being said…Cloud Computing platforms have the potential to offer adequate security controls, but it will require a level of transparency the providers will most likely not be comfortable providing.
In September of 2008 Amazon released a paper entitled “Amazon WebServices: Overview of Security Processes” which discusses, at a high-level, aspects of Amazon’s AWS (Amazon Web Services) security model. Essentially it says that they will provide a base-level of reasonable security controls against their infrastructures and the enterprise is required to provide the required security controls against their guest OS instance and other attributes of the customer environmental variables, including data backup, controls, and secure development.
The biggest problem is that you, as the consumer of this technology, will not be able to audit the security controls. You, as the consumer of this technology, will need to rely on their assertions of the controls and static (SAS 70) audits that these controls are actually in place – sans details of course.
The other big problem with the “joint” security model Amazon proposes is that it adds a level of complexity to the organization utilizing the services. They now have to manage, report against, and provide accountability for the tsunami of compliance audits in a mixed environment where infrastructure is maintained and secured by Amazon and other parts must be maintained and secured by the customer, this is in addition to, but not necessarily in cooperation with the customers current operational security models.
The rest of the paper weaves its way through traditional security mechanisms like they use firewalls and require SSH access to remote boxes, and they will totally ban someone from port scanning as well as less traditional security mechanisms, but also far less mature or proven, such as relying on the control within the Xen hypervisor.
So what are the salient aspects of the paper? Well you can read the gory details – or lack thereof – (here)
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